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I want to believe-and so do you-in a complete, transcendent,
and immanent set of propositions about right and wrong,findable rules
that authoritatively and unambiguously direct us how to live righteously. I also want to believe-and so do you-in no such thing, but
rather that we are wholly free, not only to choose for ourselves what we

ought to do, but to decide for ourselves, individually and as a species,
what we ought to be. What we want, Heaven help us, is simultaneously
to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free, that is, at the same time to
discover the right and the good and to create it.
I mention the matter here only because I think that the two contradictory impulses which together form that paradox do not exist only on
some high abstract level of arcane angst. In fact, it is my central thesis
that much that is mysterious about much that is written about law today is understandable only in the context of this tension between the
ideas of found law and made law: a tension particularly evident in the
growing, though desperately resisted, awareness that there may be, in
fact, nothing to be found-that whenever we set out to find "the law,"
we are able to locate nothing more attractive, or more final, than ourselves.
My plan for this Article, then, is as follows. I shall first try to
prove to your satisfaction that there cannot be any normative system
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ultimately based on anything except human will.' I shall then try to
trace some of the scars left on recent jurisprudential writings by this
growing, and apparently terrifying, realization. Finally, I shall say a
few things about-of all things-law and the way in which the impossinecessarily shapes attitudes toward conbility of normative grounding
2
stitutional interpretation.
Consider what a "finder" of law must do. He must reach for a set
of normative propositions in the form "one ought to do X," or "it is
right to do X," that will serve in, indeed serve as the foundation for, a
legal system. Once found, these propositions must themselves be immune from further criticism. Of course, once the finder finds what it is
he is looking for, his work is not necessarily over. He may still work
with the propositions, show their interactions, argue about their reach
and implications, rationalize, restate, and reflect. But the propositions
he has found are the premises of his system, and once found they cannot just be dispensed with. That which is found becomes a given for
the system, however the system may be systematically manipulated. It
is not created by the finder, and therefore it cannot be changed by him,
or even challenged.
Imagine, now, a legal system based upon perceived normative propositions-oughts-which are absolutely binding, wholly unquestionable, once found. Consider the normative proposition, "Thou shalt not
commit adultery." Under what circumstances, if any, would one conclude that it is wrong to commit adultery? Maybe it helps to put the
question another way: when would it be impermissible to make the
formal intellectual equivalent of what is known in barrooms and
schoolyards as "the grand sez who"? Putting it that way makes it clear
that if we are looking for an evaluation, we must actually be looking
for an evaluator: some machine for the generation of judgments on
states of affairs. If the evaluation is to be beyond question, then the
evaluator and its evaluative processes must be similarly insulated. If it
is to fulfill its role, the evaluator must be the unjudged judge, the unruled legislator, the premise maker who rests on no premises, the uncreated creator of values. Now, what would you call such a thing if it
existed? You would call it Him.
There is then, this one longstanding, widely accepted ethical and
legal system that is based upon the edicts of an unchallengeable creator
of the right and the good, in which the only job of the person who
would do right is tofind what the evaluator said. Assuming that I know
1. But see text accompanying notes 3-4 infra.
2. My colleague, Leon Lipson, once described a certain species of legal writing as, "Any-

thing you can do, I can do meta." What follows is a pure instantiation of his category.
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what the command "Thou shalt not commit adultery" means, then if
(and only if) the speaker is God, I ought not commit adultery. I ought
not because He said I ought not, and why He said that is none of my
business. And it is none of my business because it is a premise of His
system that what He says I ought not to do, I ought not to do.
It is of the utmost importance to see why a God-grounded system
has no analogues. Either God exists or He does not, but if He does not,
nothing and no one else can take His place. Anything that took His
place would also be Him. For in a God-based system, we do not define
God's utterances as unquestionable, the way we might state that a triangle has three sides and go on from there and only from there. We
are not doing the defining. Our relationship to God's moral order is
the triangle's relationship to the order of Euclidean plane geometry, not
the mathematician's. We are defined, constituted, as beings whose
adultery is wrong, bad, unlawful. Thus, committing adultery in such a
system is "naturally" bad only because the system is supernaturally
constituted.
Put another way, God, for philosophical purposes, is uniquely in
the universe that being whose every pronouncement, including evaluative ones, is a "performative utterance." A "performative" is a statement that does not describe facts or conform to them but instead
constitutes them, creates them, "performs" them. When I say, "I am
taking a walk," I am describing what I am doing. When I say, "I apologize," or "I swear," I am doing it. There is no question whether I am
accurately reporting on the world, because I am in the process of con3
stituting it.
Especially for lawyers, the realm of the performative utterance is
not arcane. It is one of the things we deeply understand, often without
knowing it. Important performatives, after all, include "I promise," "I
now pronounce you man and wife," and "This watch that I now give
you, my son, is yours."
We also understand that what a performative performs is not some
mysterious emanation of magic words, but the product of certain rules
and laws. Therefore, a performative utterance may not have, under all
circumstances, the effect it has under some. "I promise" is a promise,
but it may not result in a contract unless the promisor has capacity,
there is no fraud in the inducement, consideration is present, and so on.
"I now pronounce you man and wife" will not necessarily create the
status of marriage if, for instance, the speaker is an imposter cleric, and
3. See Hartnack, Performadve Utterances,in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 90-91
(P. Edwards ed. 1972), for a brief introduction to some of the nuances of the concept.
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at least one of the putative spouses knows it at the time.
This is why there can ordinarily or "naturally" be no such thing as
a normative performative utterance. A statement in the form "you
ought to do X," "it is right to do X," or "X is good" will establish
oughtness, rightness, or goodness only if there is a set of rules that gives
the speaker the power totally to determine the question. But it is precisely the question of who has the power to set such rules for validating
evaluations that is the central problem of ethics and, as we shall see, of
legal theory. There is no one who can be said a priori to have that
power unless the question being posed is also being begged.
Except, as noted, God. It necessarily follows that the pronouncements of an omniscient, omnipotent, and infinitely good being are always true and effectual. When God says, "Let there be light," there is
light. And when He sees that it is good, good is what it is.
Now I certainly have not gone on at such a length to clarify the
special status of God as the foundation of an ethical or legal system
because I intend to discuss whether or not He exists and can ground
such a system for us. That, obviously, is not something that can be
decided here. I have pursued this discussion for so long because it will
make it much easier to understand why there is discontent verging on
despair whenever some theorist tries to develop a system in which
"found" ethical or legal propositions are to be treated as binding, but
for which there is no supernatual grounding. God's will is binding because it is His will that it be. Under what other circumstances can the
unexamined will of anyone else withstand the cosmic "says who" and
come out similarly dispositive?
There are no such circumstances. We are never going to get anywhere (assuming for the moment that there is somewhere to get) in
ethical or legal theory unless we finally face the fact that, in the Psalmist's words, there is no one like unto the Lord. If He does not exist,
there is no metaphoric equivalent. No person, no combination of people, no document however hallowed by time, no process, no premise,
nothing is equivalent to an actual God in this central function as the
unexaminable examiner of good and evil. The so-called death of God
turns out not to have been just His funeral; it also seems to have effected the total elimination of any coherent, or even more-than-momentarily convincing, ethical or legal system dependent upon finally
authoritative extrasystemic premises. What Kurt G~del did for systems
of logic, 4 deicide has done for normative systems, including legal sys4. See Leff, Law and Technology: On Shoring Up a Void, 8 OTrAWA L. REv. 536, 538-39
(1976); Left, Book Review, 29 STAN. L. REv. 879, 887-88 (1977).
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tems.
Put briefly, if the law is "not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky," 5 then it can be only one place: in us. If we are trying to find a
substitute final evaluator, it must be one of us, some of us, all of usbut it cannot be anything else. The result of that realization is what
might be called an exhilarated vertigo, a simultaneous combination of
an exultant "We're free of God" and a despairing "Oh God, we're
free."
Thus, once it is accepted that (a) all normative statements are evaluations of actions and other states of the world; (b) an evaluation entails an evaluator; and (c) in the presumed absence of God, the only
available evaluators are people, then only a determinate, and reasonably small, number of kinds of ethical and legal systems can be generated. Each such system will be strongly differentiated by the axiomatic
answer it chooses to give to one key question: who ultimately gets to
play the role of ultimately unquestionable evaluator, a role played in
supernaturally based systems by God? Who among us, that is, ought to
be able to declare "law" that ought to be obeyed?
Stated that baldly, the question is so intellectually unsettling that
one would expect to find a noticeable number of legal and ethical
thinkers trying not to come to grips with it, if its avoidance were at all
possible. And of course it turns out that it is possible, at least as a
desperate temporary matter, and that the impulse has been actualized
in an enormous body of modem writing.
' '6
The most popular of those moves may be called "Descriptivism.
It goes like this: it is not at all necessary to specify who is generating
the legal system, much less to describe how that generation is being
effected. A legal system is a fact. It is something (including processes)
that exists. The way to identify its existence is to discover what rules
are in fact obeyed. Once you have made that identification, it is possible, at least in theory, to describe how the rules originated, and accurately to describe them as the product of certain people using certain
5. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The sky to
which Holmes was referring was a heaven in which federal judges might find common law not
generated by state legal systems. See also Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The fallacy
and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing [a 'transcendental
body of law'] to be found").

6. "Descriptivism" bears a strong family resemblance to what is often called "Positivism," a
term I carefully avoid lest I seem to be tendentiously presenting and trivializing any real person's
particular body of work. In fact, however, that is exactly what I am doing, though for a whole
school of thought. I present what I take to be the heart of a complicated body of hard thinking in
simplified, almost parodic, form so as to heighten the power of my own critical stance. This
process is known in the trade as being heuristic.
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processes.
That is, you can say if you wish that the law is "the command of
the sovereign," but that is only to say that law is the result of that of
which it is the result. If law is defined as the command of the sovereign, then the sovereign is defined as whatever it is the commands of
which are obeyed. Any sovereign is "as good as," that is, validates the
law to the same degree as, any other. The term "the law" describes not
good behavior or right behavior, but behavior. It is not that whatever
is is right, but that whatever is is as right as anything else that might be.
I find it enormously interesting that this approach to finding a replacement for a transcendent source of values involves, in effect, a redirection of metaphorical energy: to find a human equivalent for God,
there is a focus not on God's goodness, but on His power. It makes
sense. For this too may be predicated of God: whether or not it is ever
coherent to question if His will ought to be done, one way or another
His will is done. All of His "statements," evaluative and other, are
performatives: when God says, "Let there be light," light there is. It
may, of course, be His will that your will is free to do or not to do one
thing or another, but His response is inexorable-not to mention infinite and eternal.
The central difficulty with the Descriptivist position, then, for all
the subtlety and intelligence with which various adherents have elaborated it,7 is that it "validates" every legal system equally. If a valid
system is one that is in fact in place, then anything that is in fact in
place is the legal system. No particular characteristic of or procedure
employed by the "sovereign" is necessary to validate the system except
its power to generate something that is in fact obeyed. The basic engine of law is nowhere-or, rather, it is anywhere at any moment it
happens to be-and that robs Descriptivism of any critical capacity.
Under Descriptivism, it is impossible to say that anything ought or
ought not to be.
A critical jurisprudence is impossible when one gives God's place
to anyone who happens to be conventionally obeyed, with nothing
turning on who that is. If that seems unsatisfactory, then one must
finally face the question of who ought to have God's validating power.
That is, one will have to seek out some way to validate a particular
legal system without thereby necessarily validating every legal system.
Since we are talking about people, the question really is whether
7. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (M. Knight trans. 1967). K. OLIVECRONA,
LAW

As

FACT

(1939), is notable for a presentation of positivism so icy that Kelsen himself begins

to seem by comparison some kind of hot-blooded Latin.
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there is any person or set of persons whose generation of law is entitled
to final respect. The obvious first move is to decide whether one can
found a system on the premise that each person is his own ultimate
evaluative authority. In this approach, God is not only dead, but He
has been ingested seriatim at a universal feast. Everyone can declare
what ought to be for himself, and no one can legitimately criticize anyone else's values-what they are or how they came to be-because
everyone has equal ethical dignity. In this approach everything that
was true of God's evaluations is true of each person's evaluations.
Each individual's normative statements are, for him, performative utterances: what is said to be bad or good, wrong or right, is just that for
each person, solely by reason of its having been uttered.
In the absence of a supernatural validator, what could be more
"natural" than that? Alas, there is a problem: who validates the rules
for interactions when there is a multiplicity of Gods, all of identical
"rank"? The whole point of God, after all, is that there is none like
unto Him. But the whole point of turning people into Gods is to make
every one like every other one. It is totally impermissible under such a
conception for there to be, so to speak, interpersonal comparisons of
normativity: there is literally no one in a position to evaluate them
against each other.
I have been told that the ancient Babylonians, possessed of (or by)
a multiplicity of Gods and therefore faced with similar problems, concluded that in cases of conflict the big Gods ate the little ones. That
sort of move here, however, would serve only to collapse this "God-isme" solution into the "whoever-wins-is-God" approach of Descriptivism. If the difficulty with Descriptivism is that it validates any normative system, the problem with the "God-is-me" approach--call it
"Personalism"-is that it validates everyone's individual normative
system, while giving no instruction in, or warrant for, choosing among
them.
This feature of the Personalist ethical system is something of a hindrance if one wants to found a legal system on it, that is, a system
designed to govern interactions among people. It constitutes humanity
as a series of autonomous monads, each of identical "dignity," each
entitled to exactly the same respect. As long as they remain the ethical
equivalent of the atoms of Lucretius,8 raining down from some indescribable noplace, running immovably parallel, eternally untouching
and untouchable, there is, of course, no problem. A universe of ethical
solipsism is perfectly adequate. But what happens if, again like Lucre8. See T.

LUCRETIUS CARUS, THE WAY THINGS ARE

(R. Humphries trans. 1968).
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tius' atoms, they enter a world where they cannot continue on their
hermetic courses, but have to bang into each other? If they in fact
clash, that is, if people actually do affect each other when their autonomous, equally valid value sets are translated into actions, what happens? When these individual moral monads leave the world of
definition and entailment for the world of existence and causality, the
world in which legal systems operate, the Personalist has one hell of a
problem: who ought to give way?
Note that this is not the same question as who will give way. Picture two of these monstrous monads simultaneously coming upon
something that they both want (and that, by the way, they are by definition equally "right" to want). One of them shoulders the other aside
and appropriates the object, or maybe he just gets there first. One
could say it "ought" to be his because he got it: a single-instance
equivalent of Descriptivism. The key question, however, is whether,
using the assumptions of Personalism, one can say anything else. If the
impulses to possess are, by definition, equally "valid," is not the result
equally acceptable whichever way it comes out? Is there any ground
from which to criticize the method by which a monad fulfills its unchallengeable desires?
The answer is no, not at least within the confines of Personalism.
If some methods of actualizing desires in contest with other desires are
to be forbidden, the forbidding will have to be done on some basis not
entailed by the tenets of the Personalist ethic. By definition, one who
considers force an appropriate way to deal with conflicting desires is
just as justified as one who feels otherwise, for the propriety of activities in the world is no different from any other subject of evaluation.
That does not mean that one cannot generate and seek to defend a
system that provides, for instance, that the little Gods may not use force
or fraud on each other when they fall into conflict over aims. 9 One
could indeed defend a system that says that all conflicts have to be
settled somehow to the satisfaction of both contending parties.' 0 One
could say that such a rule for interdivinity transactions will produce
more health or wealth or wisdom, and that health, wealth, and wisdom
are good." What one cannot do is defend it on the basis of Godlet
2
preference.'
9. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, in which an intelligent and very enthusiastic Personalist shows his
recognition of the impossibility of generating out of mere autonomy rules for interautonomous
conflicts by insisting on what he calls "side constraints" on people's actions vis-a-vis each other.
See especially Id. 26-53.
10. See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Posner.
12. One could not, that is, unless it somehow turned out that all the individuals were not only
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Hence it should come as no surprise that a system of "each-Godfor-himself' is not, by itself, much of a solution to any basic problem of
human society. Nor is there any way out for a Personalist via "agreement," real or hypothetical. Absolutely nothing is gained by hypothesizing or even bringing about some "contract" or treaty among the
13
monads about what they are permitted to do with or to each other.
Under the Personalist view, a promise ought to be kept only if each
promisor thinks it ought to be kept; the value of promise-keeping is no
different from any other.
What then is left? Pure Descriptivism is exactly what it purports to
be: a description of a state of affairs with no normative content at all.
The Personalist, internalizing God on a one-man-one-God basis, leaves
evaluations of interactions between the Godlets formally impossible. If
the receptacle for God's evaluative role cannot therefore be either
"wherever it is"or "equally in everyone," then where can it be?
The next move, one would guess, would be to find some way to
distinguish among the individuals either quantitatively through some
aggregation principle, or qualitatively. One might choose to stand, that
is, on the most evaluations or the best ones.
Over the first alternative, counting noses, we need not linger long.
If we assume that it is impermissible to distinguish qualitatively among
the entities being counted-if by stipulation we are not allowed to look
inside the heads from which the noses protrude, and if each individual
is by definition as "right" and "good" as every other-then all our
count tells us is that a multiplicity of perfectly virtuous monads are not
necessarily also identical. If we are to cope with the matter through a
vote, it must be because of some rule that itself cannot be derived from
any monad or combination thereof. All one has is the assumed conclusion that in cases of conflicting perfections, the largest number wins.
Can we then get out of our bind by deciding after all to pay attention to the quality of the ethical boxes? No, we cannot. The shortest
way to put the reason is this: a fundamental assumption of the perfectmonad Personalist view is that no inquiry can be made of the quality of
any ethical position held by a monad. Each one is his own God. That
is the whole purpose of the Personalist view, to insulate fundamental
of equal ethical dignity, but, at least on this matter, held substantively identical normative positions. See text accompanying notes 24-25 infra. Even then one would have at the base of one's
ethical system nothing more than a Descriptivist fact, albeit an interesting anthropological one.
See Leff, Book Review, supra note 4, at 882-84.
13. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTIcE (1971), for the most magisterial modem example of
this hypothetical-contract move (not, however, tied to Personalism in the sense of the term used
here).
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ethical conclusions from any further examination. If monad A believes
X, and monad B believes Y, it is central to the system that there is no
criterion for choosing between X and Y. The moment one suggests a
criterion, then individual men have ceased to be the measure of all
things, and something else-and that necessarily means someone elsehas been promoted to the (formally impossible) position of evaluatorin-chief.
Nonetheless, this impulse to give different weights to different positions based on their "quality" is so common in modem ethical discourse that it deserves further consideration. After all, very rarely do
modern moralists actually give the ethical positions of the people on
the Clapham Omnibus equal weight. Notably preferred to them are
the people in the professorial Volvo, ostensibly because they do not
have just any old view of an ethical question, but a "considered" view,
or a "serious and reflective" view, or may even have reached the envia4
ble state of being in "reflective equilibrium."'
I am making fun of all this, but I should not. Underlying this
impulse to rate certain positions over others is the understandable and
perhaps unavoidable human desire to give human reason some role in
ethical theory. One would think that a fully considered moral position,
the product of deep and thorough intellectual activity, one that fits together into a fairly consistent whole, would deserve more respect than
shallow, expletive, internally inconsistent ethical decisions. Alas, to
think that would be to think wrong: labor and logic have no necessary
connection to ethical truth.
Let us say that person A decides that one ought to do X under
particular circumstances. Person B believes that under those circumstances one ought to do Y. Person A's conclusion is based upon deep
and mature thought and comes out of an intellectual structure such that
doing X will work no discernible contradiction with anything else he
might think one ought to do. Not so Person B. He thinks one ought to
do Y, but he has not thought about it, and if he did think about it he
would recognize that doing Y is totally, flagrantly inconsistent with a
host of other things he thinks one ought to do. Should one not in such
a situation give more weight to A's position than to B's? Only if someone has the power to declare careful, consistent, coherent ethical propositions "better" than the sloppier, more impulsive kinds. Who has
that power and how did he get it?
Of course, B himself might concur. If A shows B that B's decision
grows out of or into a logical muddle, B may decide to go along with A.
14. See id.20-22, 48-5 1.

Vol. 1979:1229]

UNSPEAK4BLE ETHICS

1239

Monads are not necessarily sealed off from each other. But what if B
does not care, that is, what if his own evaluation system does not require logical consistency, let alone elegance? Can A (or we) say that B
is ethically mistaken? If B will not be persuaded, can he be threatened
into changing his views, or physically forced? Where do we get that
power? Bluntly, intellectual beauty is not a necessary prerequisite to
ethical adequacy unless someone declares it to be. 15
Of course, if ethical propositions are made subject to intellectual
criteria, ethical discourse is made more interesting, not to mention possible. Once certain intellectual canons are accepted, one can criticize
another's conclusion with respect to those canons. The argument
(1) p = q;
(2) if p, then x;
(3) if q, then not x
doubtless can be described as lousy argument, whether the lettersp, q,
and x stand for propositions of mathematics or of ethics. But so what?
The aim of ethical discourse is ethics, not discourse, and a piece of
lousy thinking is not necessarily "immoral."
And with the elimination of any requirement that ethical statements be coherent goes any requirement for any particular process
leading to more intelligent and intelligible decisions.' 6 It would be surprising, after all, if a system based upon the existence of ethical monads
whose normative premises are by definition beyond inquiry were also
to incorporate some necessary, and necessarily normative, rule about
communicating them, for instance, that they explain themselves to each
other. Gods have their own individual rules for chatting, even with
each other. No one else can say that a certain process-free speech, for
instance, or equal access to each other-is required, unless there is a
super-God who can insist.
There remains, then, only one considerable approach to the validation of ethical systems. Under it no search is made for any evaluator,
but rather some state of the world is declared to be good, and acts
which effect that state are ethical acts. Merely to express this approach
is, of course, to refute it, for a good state of the world must be good to
someone. One cannot escape from the fact that a normative statement
is an evaluation merely by dispensing with any mention of who is making it. Hence the description of a particular end-state-human happi15. See id. 49 ("It is simply good fortune that the principles of celestial mechanics have their
intellectual beauty").
16. The apotheosis in modem jurisprudence of this idea that intelligibility is a normative
category is most likely L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969), especially in the chapter, The Minimum Content of a Substantive NaturalLaw at 184-86.
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ness' 7 or wealth'18-as a validator of a system, is just another evaluatorcentered approach, but with blinkers added. Wealth is good, and
makes our acts good, if someone, or some collection of someones, says
so. But which someone or someones count still has to be accounted for.
I have gone through the preceding elaborate discussion because it
leads to an important assertion about legal systems in general and ours
in particular. There is no such thing as an unchallengeable evaluative
system. There is no way to prove one ethical or legal system superior
to any other, unless at some point an evaluator is asserted to have the
final, uncontradictable, unexaminable word. That choice of unjudged
judge, whoever is given the role, is itself, strictly speaking, arbitrary.
But if the system in addition presumes to coherence, then once the
final-evaluator role is distributed, almost all questions must be answered determinatively in a manner characteristic of, and in all important ways predictable from, the original assignment of final evaluative
power. It is thus the first assumption, combined with simple canons of
intellectual coherence (the need for which is itself an undefendable assumption),' 9 that determines the legal result in any particular instance.
One methodological consequence of the unprovability of the bases
of any legal or ethical system is that it makes one particular kind of
scholarly work attractively easy to write. If a series of values is set forth
to be justified---"proved" in the strong sense used here-all attempts
will necessarily fail. On the other hand, if the set includes a value that
is to prevail unless some other contradictory value is "proved," then the
value not requiring proof will always win. That is, an argument in the
form "X, unlessp, q, or r" will always generate "therefore X," if the
system makes it impossible to establishp, q, or r.
A splendid example of that scholarly move is Robert Nozick's
book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which opens: "Individuals have
rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."'20 Nozick devotes much of the rest of the
book to showing how no contrary position-for instance, that the poor,
as a class, have rights against the rich or that the sick have rights
against the well-can be established. 2 1 But obviously each of those positions (and alas, an infinity of others too) could be established the
17. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION

(1789), may be taken as a locus classicus for this view. Also see J. RAwLs, supra note 13, at 22 n.9,

for other works in the tradition.
18. See, e.g., Posner.
19. See id.I10.
20.

R. NozICK ix.

id.167-74 (Redistribution and Property Rights).
21. See, e.g.,
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same way "Individuals have rights..." was established, by simple de22

clarative assertion.
I certainly do not want to suggest that Nozick is unique in this
mode of argument. It is hard to know, in fact, how else one could proceed, given the proven unprovability of normative propositions. At
some point in every sustained argument about what is right or wrong,
or what ought or ought not to be done, some normative proposition
about who has the final power over normative propositions will have to
be asserted. It may be veiled or open, but it will have to be there. And
once it is there, whatever it is, it will determine the form of the system
that emerges.
That is why works that seem so different in surface detail turn out
to have so surprisingly much in common. For example, any system the
central premise of which is that individuals may not morally be dominated by other individuals, no matter how many of them there are, will
encounter identical problems and not surprisingly will tend to come up
with similar "solutions." As we have seen, the problem with turning
each person into an evaluative Godlet is that it is then impossible to
ground rules for how the individuals ought to deal with each other. To
put it another way, if the individuals are assumed to be simultaneously
equal and nonidentical, there must be conflict, and that conflict cannot
be adjudicated by any extra-individual evaluation system.
As suggested earlier, 23 however, that fatal weakness in the radical
individualist position would melt away if, in some mysterious way,
equal dignity could be joined to identical evaluation; if everyone believed the same thing were right, there would be no conflict. But there
is a strong empirical implausibility to the existence of identical evaluative criteria, at any level above triviality, for any collection of real individuals. Thus, we find two scholars as different in approach as
Nozick24 and Roberto Unger, 25 both committed to a no-domination
constraint on interpersonal behavior, making almost identical moves.
What they both do is hypothesize some process that would lead to geographic concentrations of the like-minded, which grouplets would then
coexist, but at a spatial remove, with other concentrations of otherminded individuals. The processes leading to the creation of these
mini-societies, insofar as they are described at all, are vastly different in
22. Consider, for instance, what would happen if the Nozick book had begun "Individuals

have duties, and there are things persons may not fail to do (without violating their duties)."

Nozick himself is fully aware of the nakedness of his opening assertion. See id. xiv ("This book
does not present a precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights"). See also Id. 9.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. See R. NOZICK.
25. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
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the two works, but the result is the same: conflict among the individuals within the subgroups, while not treated as technically impossible, is
treated, implicitly, as vastly less important once the individual members have found each other. Individuality, that is, is seen as being retained at relatively low individual cost.
The conceptual difficulty with this solution (leaving totally aside
the practical implausibilities of the processes envisioned) is that conflict
necessitated by a system of equally "right" monads is merely transferred to the level, so to speak, of international law. Each little cluster
of individuals may have become normatively homogeneous, but the
world now consists of heterogeneous clusters, and by hypothesis the
beliefs of no one of them are entitled to more respect than those of any
other. All that has been achieved is the creation of corporative, agglutinative, nonbiological "individuals" whose evaluations are to remain
unquestionable. But which rules ought to govern their interactions is a
26
question that, necessarily, still has no answer.
Interestingly enough, the same basic move-generating a process
that will produce identical biological individuals so as to eliminate conflict over values-is typical of some forms of neo-Marxism, which is
moderately resurgent of late in (of all places) legal scholarship. 27 This
"Marxist" move 28 is to make the winnowing and duplicating process
temporal rather than, like Unger's and Nozick's, spatial. The Marxist
utopia is located in a blessed future when there will be only one class
that, at least impliedly, will have no evaluative conflict.29 The vision is
a powerful one because it does not leave the landscape dotted with presumably antagonistic agglutinations of the militantly like-minded.
There will be no need for any "international law" governing interclass
30
conflicts of morality because all the other "classes" will be gone.
Still another ethical system, Richard Posner's, reaches a similar
result, albeit from a different direction. 3 1 Nonetheless, it ends up for
Posner too that, with trivial exceptions, no person may dominate any
26. Both Unger and Nozick are ostentatiously unconvincing in dealing with this "international law" problem. See R. NOZICK 329-30; R. UNGER, supra note 25, at 284-89.
27. The "Conference on Critical Legal Studies," a loosely knit group made up mostly of law
teachers from around the country, appears to be flourishing and also to be "Marxist," at least in
the sense that the things one is supposed to be critical about are bourgeois law and legal categories. The Conference, for example, took part in cosponsoring a panel at the 1979 Annual Meeting
of the Law and Society Association on "Marxist Approaches to Law." See Conference on Critical
Legal Studies, Newsletter (Mar. 1979).
28. As usual, that is not necessarily to be taken as equivalent to "Marx's move."
29. See, e.g., H. MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION 134-39 (1955).
30. It is not clear how much active, albeit temporary, nastiness will have been necessarily
implicated in the way the other classes "went."
31. See Posner. It must be pointed out that my discussion of this piece focuses on a narrow,
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other. Desires are taken as given, beyond external criticism, and no
one may be forced, either individually or socially, to do anything for or
to oneself or anyone else. Only force and fraud are side-constrained in
the operation of the system; any desire for them is illicit.
In this construct, anything two individuals agree to with respect to
each other is fine. When there is interaction between monads that is
not conffictive, then that interaction is obviously good. When there is
an interaction that does not lead to an agreement, then there is nothing.
Just as for Nozick any individual can choose not to agglutinate, for
Posner every individual can choose not to deal. If he does choose not
to deal, the only result is no deal.
Moreover, as one can be neither praised nor blamed for dealing or
not dealing, what Posner brings off, in effect, is a rather interesting
merger of Descriptivism and Personalism. This time, it is not societies
that are what they are and uncriticizably so, but individuals. They just
make ad hoc social relationships that become, like the legal order of the
Descriptivist, immune to ethical criticism.
There are, of course, small problems with Posner's system, and
more important, within Posner's system. 32 One of the criteria he lists
that can be used to reject an ethical theory is that it "yields precepts
sharply contrary to widely shared ethical intuitions." 33 But, as he recognizes, there is
[a] less welcome implication of [this] . . .approach . . .that
people who are very poor-not those who merely lack ready cash,
but those who have insufficient earning power to be able to cover the
expenses of a minimum decent standard of living-count only if they
are part of the utility function of someone who has wealth. In a rigorous application of the wealth-maximization criterion, there is (with
limited exceptions discussed later) no public duty to support the indialbeit necessary, part of it, and leaves out most of what Professor Posner would undoubtedly

consider the genuine contributions of his essay.
32. That is, there are problems in addition to the nongroundability that afflicts all ethical

systems. See notes 1-18 supra and accompanying text.
33. Posner 110. The entire passage reads:
I shall proceed on the basis that an ethical theory cannot really be validated but that
to meet certain basic
it can be rejected on one of three grounds: first, that the theory fails
formal criteria of adequacy, such as logical consistency, completeness, definiteness, and
the like; second, that the theory yields precepts sharply contrary to widely shared ethical
intuitions-precepts such as that murder is in general a good thing or that a sheep is
normally entitled to as much consideration as a man; or third, that a society which
adopted the theory would not survive in competition with societies following competing
theories. The third is a very controversial criterion, and one that I shall not pursue in
this paper as it does not afford a basis for drawing sharp distinctions between the economic and the utilitarian approaches. I shall, however, argue that judged either by the
formal criteria or by conformity with our moral intuitions, the economic approach is less
"rejectable" than utilitarianism or Kantianism.
Id. 110-11.
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gent. This conclusion may seem to ascribe excessive significance to
an individual's particular endowment of capacities. If he happens to
be born feeble-minded and his net social product is negative, he
would have no right to the means of support though there was nothing blameworthy in his inability to support himself. This result
grates on modem sensibilities yet I see no escape from it that is consistent with any of the major ethical systems. The view Rawls and
others have promoted that the individual's genetic endowment is a

kind of accident devoid of moral significance is inconsistent with the
Kantian notions of individuality from which the view is purportedly
deduced. To treat the inventor and the idiot equally so far as their
moral claim to command over valuable resources is concerned does
not take the differences between persons seriously. .

.

. A related

the autonomy of
point is that any policy of redistribution impairs
34
those from whom the redistribution is made.
This translates as follows: "If, quite innocently, you turn out not to be
the kind of person found usable by someone else, you die."'35 Just as
"the optimal population of sheep is determined not by speculation on
their capacity for contentment relative to that of people but by the intersection of the marginal product and marginal cost of keeping
sheep,"' 36 so the value of a poor man, one with nothing anyone wants to
buy, not even with an attractive enough helplessness to attract altruism,
is zero.
This is not an accidental effect of Posner's system. As his regretful
tone makes clear, it is a necessary result. The premises of the Posnerian
ethical system are as follows: (a) whatever anyone wants is fine; each
of the Seven Deadly Sins is as licit as each of the others, and as any of
the Cardinal Virtues; (b) no value that involves another person can be
realized without that other person's free consent; (c) no aggregation of
people can force that consent on any person. There is, by stipulation,
nothing licit that can be collectively done, for all morality is contained
in individual values-subject to a side-constraint against individually
applied force and fraud. Hence, it necessarily follows that if no one
will freely consent to deal with Person X, Person X has had it. And
this follows naturally and unavoidably from one's laudable desire to
"take the differences between persons seriously." 37 The nonculpably
34. Id. 128 (footnote omitted).
35. "Usable" includes, of course, being used to create the utility another might derive from

raining alms on you. Also see Posner 131, for a reasonably calm contemplation of modest
amounts of coerced redistribution to the poor to buy them off from a life of crime, or to deal with

a small market imperfection, "the public-good aspects of charitable giving."
36. Id.; Vf Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,405 (1856) ("[Slaves] had no rights

or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant
them").
37. See Posner 128.
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poor must be allowed to become autonomously deceased.
38
This is the kind of thing that gives intuitionism a bad name, I
suppose, but intuitionism has not had an especially good name anyway.
The more important observation is that the Posnerian ethical move, as
with all ethical systems based upon unexaminable individual preferences, necessarily fails to build any political structure. All it can
achieve, even with its side-constraints against force and fraud-themselves arbitrary, in the sense that they do not necessarily follow from
individualistic ethics-is an ad hoc, deal-by-deal "community."
Whereas the Marxists place their "community" in the foggy sea of the
future, and Nozick and Unger place theirs like dots of butter in a buttermilk of potential strife, Posner leaves his version of sanctified human
interaction to moments of firefly-like flash. When the flashes go out, or
fail to go on, then there is nothing at all but the dark.
I have told these too-brief-for-fairness tales about various currently popular ethical approaches concretely to illustrate what is, I
think, already obvious: not only will the choice of any nonsupernatural
source of ethical premises be arbitrary, but choosing either "natural"
alternative locus-the individual or society-will lead to either individual or social implausibilities. If each person is a Godlet, there is no
room for a valid society; if each society is God, there is no space for
individual freedom. And if the two approaches are mixed-society can
insist on X, but the individual has a right to Y-there is no way, except
by deception or bluster, to ground all the divers X's and Y's.
Which brings me, at last, to the lawyer's dog to be wagged by the
enormous preceding tail of this Article. I would suggest that the
United States Constitution, and many of our legal problems with it, can
be illuminated by the foregoing analysis. None of the problems can, as
you might have guessed, be solved that way, but that is the whole point:
all of our problems of constitutional interpretation arise because it is
most likely impossible to write a constitution, or create one by interpretation, that does not simultaneously invoke more than one theory as to
where ultimate, unchallengeable normative power is to be placed. Or,
at any rate, that seems to be the case with respect to the real Constitution we have.
Assume for the moment that the Constitution can be treated as
God, and that it is not only transcendent but immanent, that there is a
way in which, when it speaks to us, we can hear it.39 If one looks at it
38. One of Posner's tests for an adequate ethical theory, remember, is that it not yield

"precepts sharply contrary to widely shared ethical intuitions." Id. 110.

39. Whether we can really "hear" the Constitution on any important question has frequently
been questioned and, seemingly, more frequently of late. See, e.g., Ely, ConstitutionalInterreiv-

1246

DUKE LAW JOURNiAL

[Vol. 1979:1229

for its message about who has final evaluative power under its aegis, it
becomes plain that its most important element is a structurally basic
equivocation. "The people" have the ultimate normative word, of
course, but it is ostentatiously unclear whether that God-like role is
lodged in "the people" as a category, or in each constituent person of
"the people." Or, in the language of traditional constitutional analysis,
along with a structure setting up checks and balances between state and
national power, and among executive, legislative, and judicial powers,
and between "the people" and each foregoing instantiation of "government," ultimate normative power is divided between two fundamentally different conceptions of personhood: person as fundamental
moral building block of "people," and person as mere constituent cell
of the fundamental moral entity known as "the people." In short, the
Constitution simultaneously establishes rights and democracy.
It may by now be obvious why it could not be otherwise. As we
have seen, if total, final normative authority were assigned to each biological individual, and he were made morally autonomous, no rules to
govern the interaction between those individuals-the Godlets, as I
have called them-could be justified under the assumption of moral
autonomy. There would be nothingbut rights. If, on the other extreme,
moral finality were lodged in "the people" as a class, then no claim for
moral breathing space could be upheld for any atom out of which the
class was constituted. If "the people" decided, by whatever process it
validated, what was right, it would be unchallengeably right for each
person: there could be no rights.
Thus, under the second, collectivist, conception, individual evaluations would be morally meaningless. Under the first, individualist,
concept, judgments of collective interactions would be morally impossible. But if I am correct that people rightly see themselves simultaneously as part of "the people" and as autonomous persons, neither of
these results is attractive. Nor was it attractive to the drafters of the
Constitution, nor is it to many subsequent interpreters. It is thus with
respect to this dual self-image that the Constitution really plays God.
It commands that both of these conceptions of the final lodging place of
evaluative power be simultaneously reflected in the operation of the
American polity; that is, it attempts to do something that can be done
by neither an individually nor a collectively grounded system.
Since the Constitution is not God, its case-by-case allocations of
Godship are, in the sense I have used the term, "arbitrary." But that
Ism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. U. 399 (1978); Ely, Foreword- On DiscoveringFunda-

mental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5 (1978).
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does not mean that those allocations do not exist: that clipping should
nullify a touchdown pass is also arbitrary in that sense, but that does
not mean there is no such rule or result. With respect to the collectivist
aspects of the Constitution, there are side-bar restrictions on how the
collectivity can make its decisions (notably various aggregation rules,
like majoritarianism), rules on who counts as part of the group, and
most important, restrictions upon the way in which collective determinations can be enforced against individuals in the collective (notably
the detailed regulations constituting due process, and, indeed, the institution of the judicial branch itself). Moreover, certain areas of individual activity are withdrawn from collective interference-religious
beliefs, for example.
At the same time, however, the very existence of these collective
powers acts as a restriction upon individual evaluative autonomy. To
put it very briefly, if you do not want to be taxed for the common good
as the common good is defined by the group, tough.
As long as the Constitution is accepted, or at least not overthrown,
it successfully functions as a God would in a valid ethical system: its
restrictions and accommodations govern. They could be other than
they are, but they are what they are, and that is that. There will be, as
with all divine pronouncements, a continuous controversy over what
God says, but whatever the practical importance of the power to determine those questions, they are theoretically unthreatening. It is only
when the Constitution ceases to be seen as fulfilling God's normative
role, ceases, that is, to be outside the normative system it totally constitutes, or when, as is impossible with a real God, it is seen to have
"gaps," that a crisis comes to exist. What "wins" when the Constitution
will not say, or says two things at the same time?
At that point, you see, we are really forced to see ourselves as
lawmakers rather than law finders, and we are immediately led into a
regress that is, fatally, not infinite. We can say that a valid legal system
must have some minimum process for rational determination and operation. We can say that the majority cannot consistently disadvantage
any minority. We can say that, whatever else a majority can do, it
cannot systematically prevent a minority from seeking to become a majority. We can say all sorts of things, but what we cannot say is why
one say is better than any other, unless we state some standard by
which it definedly is. To put it as bluntly as possible, if we go to find
what law ought to govern us, and if what we find is not an authoritative
Holy Writ but just ourselves, just people, making that law, how can we
be governed by what we have found?
Naturally, one need not be on crisis alert all the time. Even if it is
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hard to come up with any convincing reason why a two-hundred-yearold document ought to be given final respect, indeed to be given any
respect, on some current question about the allocation of power and
freedom in America, it is awfully hard to be a credible constitutional
thinker by treating the Constitution as irrelevant. It is, therefore, a convention of constitutional law, and may be of American society, that (a)
the Constitution does speak to our problems; (b) it can, much of the
time, be heard and understood; and (c) when you do hear and understand it, that's it. That is, much of the time one can act as if there is, for
constitutional determinations, a God, though He may occasionally
mumble.
Hence it is possible to "handle" any number of questions by trying
to understandwhat the Constitution says. It is possible to say that suchand-such is a problem of equal protection, ie., that "the God" accords
all people equal dignity and will not allow mere people to do otherwise.
It is possible to say that such-and-other is a question of due process,
i e., that "the God" treats all people as rational, and communication
channels for the determination of truth must be kept open. It is not
possible, however, forever to avoid having to ask whether, in a particular instance, the individual with a "right" or the collectivity with its
"power" is to govern. For the Constitution clearly says that there are
circumstances in which the collective may override the normative beliefs of a bare numerical minority, and other circumstances in which
one biological individual is entitled to withstand everyone else, but the
Constitution does not exhaustively specify which circumstances are
which. The Constitution as God says, in effect, that one wins out over
the other when it, the Constitution, says so, and not when the individual or the group says so. But what then can one do when the Constitution, quite obviously, says nothing at all?
Along with John Ely, one can say that in those cases the collective
wins, but only if it sticks to certain processes for its own activities, notably those designed to keep the political process open.40 Or, like
Michael Perry, one can try, whenever the crunch comes, to discover
some deep beliefs of "the people" that are not, for some reason, accurately reflected in the political process. 41 With Alexander Bickel one
can look to stable traditions, 42 or with Laurence Tribe to substantive
40. See Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode of JudicialReview, 37 MD. L. REv.

451 (1978).
41. See, e.g., Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals,and The Police Power: The EthicalFunction
ofSubstantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 689 (1976).
42. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
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intuitions.43 The point is, one must be arbitrary in locating the ultimately, unchallengeable arbiter of evaluations, if the two specified by
the applicable God, in this instance the Constitution, do not in fact
agree. To put it concisely, if the applicable God is going to insist upon
being incoherent, we really have no choice but to be arbitary.
All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what
we know about ourselves and each other, this is an extraordinarily
unappetizing prospect; looking around the world, it appears that if all
men are brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel. Neither reason,
nor love, nor even terror, seems to have worked to make us "good,"
and worse than that, there is no reason why anything should. Only if
ethics were something unspeakable by us, could law be unnatural, and
therefore unchallengeable. As things now stand, everything is up for
grabs.
Nevertheless:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and
Pol Pot-and General Custer too-have earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
God help us.

43. See L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

450-55 (1978).

